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WAR CRIMES, INC.: THE ATS CASE AGAINST THE U.S.
WEAPONS INDUSTRY FOR AIDING AND ABETTING
ATROCITIES IN YEMEN
Elizabeth Beavers*
Abstract
The U.S. weapons industry provides much of the weaponry necessary
to facilitate indiscriminate mass bombings by a Saudi-led coalition in
Yemen, many of which amount to war crimes. The Alien Tort Statute
(ATS) provides an avenue for Yemeni survivors to seek redress in U.S.
Courts for unlawful strikes knowingly facilitated by U.S. weapons
companies. This Article will assess, in four sections, the viability of an
ATS case against a U.S. weapons manufacturer. The first section will
outline the relevant background of the conflict in Yemen and the role that
the United States government and weapons industry plays in fueling the
conflict. The second section will set up the necessary background for a
hypothetical ATS case by first detailing the relevant precedent, then
identifying potential Yemeni plaintiffs. The third section will walk
through three hurdles that our plaintiff will face in order to successfully
mount their ATS case: (1) supporting claims that meet the test established
by the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain;1 (2)
establishing that the claims sufficiently "touch and concern" the territory
of the United States as required by Kiobel v. RoyalDutch Petroleum Co.;2
and (3) arguing that U.S. corporations may face liability under the ATS.
The fourth and final section will walk through potential defenses that our
corporate defendant may raise and why they should fail.

* Elizabeth Beavers is currently a LL.M. student at Georgetown University Law Center
in National Security & International Human Rights Law. Elizabeth served as Associate Policy
Director for the Indivisible Project and led the organization's advocacy efforts on foreign policy,
national security, democracy, and human rights. Before that, Elizabeth was the Senior
Campaigner on national security and human rights for the U.S. section of Amnesty International,
where she worked to reform the U.S. government's national security policies in line with
international human rights standards through high-level advocacy, media engagement, and
grassroots organizing. Elizabeth also managed the Militarism & Civil Liberties program at the
Friends Committee on National Legislation. She is a Senior Fellow with Data for Progress and
Vice President of the board of the National Religious Campaign Against Torture.
1. Sosav. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730-31 (2004).
2. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013).
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"I quickly went to the farm. There, I found a horrifying scene, and I
saw my sisters and sister-in-law and all of my brother's children and
sisters' children dead. None of them were left." - Salehah Sara, survivor
of a strike in Yemen by a Raytheon-made bomb. 4
"I lay down next to my husband and I told him, '[w]e will die
together."' - Abeer Jubari, survivor of a strike in Yemen by a Raytheonmade bomb.5
"It was a very touching scene because they were hugging each
other . . Khalid's hand was cut off, and I realized the hand we had found
earlier was his." - Saeed Al-Sufiyani, on recovering the remains of his
neighbor and her son in the rubble of a strike in Yemen by a Boeing-made
bomb.6
"I heard the sound [of the explosion] and got worried, so I sent my
other son, Muhammed, to go look for his brother. He found [Ali's] body
on the beach, with shrapnel in his head." - Muqrin Mudarij, survivor of
a strike in Yemen by a Textron Systems-made bomb.7

3. Tim
Shorrock
(@TimothyS),
TWITTER (Aug.
18, 2018, 4:52 PM),
https://twitter.com/Timothy S/status/1030920463822868480 (capturing a screenshot from CNN).
4.
EUROPE

MWATANA FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ET AL., DAY OF JUDGMENT: THE ROLE OF THE US AND
IN

CIVILIAN

DEATH,

DESTRUCTION,

AND

IN YEMEN 39 (2019),
Day-of-Judgment Mwatana .pdf.

TRAUMA

https://mwatana.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Final-Design
5. Id. at 47.

6. Id. at 50.
7. Id. at 69.
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INTRODUCTION

In August 2018, CNN flashed a graphic on-screen with a map of
Yemen and markings detailing civilian casualties resulting from recent
airstrikes in the country's ongoing civil war. In an unusual step, the
graphic included labels identifying the American companies that
manufactured and sold each bomb responsible for those casualties.' This
visual brought into sharp relief a harrowing reality: Yemen is burning,
and American corporations are helping it happen.
The U.S. weapons industry provides much of the weaponry necessary
to facilitate indiscriminate mass bombings by a Saudi-led coalition in
Yemen, many of which amount to war crimes. The stories referenced in
this Article represent just a few of the lives harmed in the course of the
Yemen civil war. Yet despite consistent public reporting detailing the
damage and calls from the international community to halt sales, the flow

8. Shorrock, supra note 3.
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of weapons from the United States remains seemingly endless, and
accountability is in short supply.
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) provides an avenue for Yemeni
survivors to seek redress in U.S. Courts for unlawful strikes knowingly
facilitated by U.S. weapons companies. This Article will assess, in four
sections, the viability of an ATS case against a U.S. weapons
manufacturer like Lockheed Martin or Raytheon. The first section will
outline the relevant background of the conflict in Yemen and the role that
the United States government and weapons industry plays in fueling the
conflict. The second section will set up the necessary background for an
ATS case by first detailing the relevant precedent, then identifying
potential Yemeni plaintiffs. The third section will walk through three
hurdles that our plaintiff will face in order to successfully mount their
ATS case: (1) supporting claims that meet the test established by the
Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain; 9 (2) establishing
that the claims sufficiently "touch and concern" the territory of the United
States as required by Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.;10 and (3)
arguing that U.S. corporations may face liability under the ATS. The
fourth and final section will walk through potential defenses that our
corporate defendant may raise and why they should fail.
I. THE CONFLICT IN YEMEN AND THE ROLE OF U.S. WEAPONS
MANUFACTURERS

A. BackgroundContext of the Conflict
What began as a civil war has escalated into an internationallyinvolved bloodbath." The current war in Yemen launched in 2015
between the government and a rebel group known as the Houthis that
overtook the Yemeni capital of Sanaa.1 2 President Abdo Rabbo Mansour
Hadi's government requested assistance from Saudi Arabia in pushing
back against the rebel incursion, 13 and a Saudi-led coalition, including
9. Sosav. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730-31 (2004).

10. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013).
11. See Shireen Al-Adeimi, As War on Yemen Hits 4-Year Mark, Here's a BriefHistory of
U.S. Involvement, IN THESE TIMES (Mar. 25, 2019), https://inthesetimes.com/article/21806/yemen

-war-saudi-arabia-uae-trump-obama-famine-power-khanna-sanders; see also Bruce Riedel, A
BriefHistory ofAmerica's Troubled Relationship with Yemen, BROOKINGS: ORDER FROM CHAOS

(Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/10/22/a-brief-history-

of-americas-troubled-relationship-with-yemen/.
12. See April Longley Alley, Yemen 's Houthi Takeover, INT'L CRISIS GRP. (Dec. 22, 2014),
https ://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemens-houthi-takeover; see also Adam Baron, Mapping the Yemen Conflict, EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS (July 2019), https://www.ecfr.eu/mena/yemen.

13. U.N. GROUP OF EMINENT INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL EXPERTS ON YEMEN,
SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN YEMEN, INCLUDING VIOLATIONS AND ABUSES SINCE SEPTEMBER

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol31/iss2/1
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nine Middle Eastern and North African countries, subsequently began
bombing Yemen with the stated goal of restoring Hadi to the
presidency.1 4 The Saudis insisted at the outset that the war would
conclude quickly, yet the coalition's air campaign has thus far proved
unsuccessful in dislodging the Houthis."
A Group of Eminent Experts assembled by the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights released a report in September 2019
detailing its findings that all parties to the conflict have committed serious
violations of international humanitarian law and international human
rights law' 6 and that indiscriminate Saudi-led coalition airstrikes are
responsible for most of the civilian casualties and "may lead to criminal
responsibility for war crimes at all levels of command." 1 7 Accurate
counts are difficult to ascertain given the abysmal conditions on the
ground, 18 but estimates as of this writing indicate that the death toll from
the bombing has surpassed 100,000 and is rapidly climbing.19

2014 13 (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/GEE-Yemen
/A_HRC_42_CRP_1.PDF [hereinafter GRP. OF EMINENT EXPERTS].

14. Id.
15. Mohamed Bazzi, The United States Could End the War in Yemen If It Wanted To,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/iran-

yemen-saudi-arabia/571465/. Many also characterize the conflict as a proxy Saudi-Iran war, as
Iran has opportunistically seized upon the conflict to increase its regional influence via support to
the Houthis. The level of Iran's support to the Houthis is disputed. ; Adam Taylor, Why Iran is
getting the blame for an attack on Saudi Arabia claimedby Yemen's Houthis, WASH. POST (Sept.
16, 2019, 1:07 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/ 09/16/why-iran-is-gettingblame-an-attack-saudi-arabia-claimed-by-yemens-houthis/; Mareike Transfeld, Iran's Small
Hand in Yemen,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
FOR INT'L PEACE
(Feb.
14, 12017),
https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/67988.
16. GRP. OF EMINENT EXPERTS, supra note 14, at 221.

17. Id. Note that The Saudi-led coalition rejects these characterizations. See, e.g., Nima
Elbagir et al., Bomb that Killed 40 Children in Yemen Was Supplied By the US, CNN (Aug. 17,
2018, 7:50 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/17/middleeast/us-saudi-yemen-bus-strike-intl/

index.html "("The democratically elected government of Yemen has been displaced by an Iranianbacked insurgency by minority Houthi militias. The coalition is in Yemen with the support of the
U.N. Security Council to restore the legitimate government. The coalition is operating in
accordance with international humanitarian law, taking all practical measures to minimize civilian
casualties. Every civilian casualty is a tragedy.").
18. Kareem Fahim, The deadly war in Yemen rages on. So why does the death toll stand
still?, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the-deadly-

war-in-yemen-rages-on-so-why-does-the-death-toll-stand-still-/2018/08/02/e6d9ebca-90

lle8-ae59-01880eac5fldstory.html?utm_term=.8d50227fdade

("It

is

almost

22certainly

conservative and possibly grossly underestimated, according to U.N. officials and analysts who
study the conflict. . . . The undercount would reflect in part the impossible task of tallying deaths
in war zones, where parties to the hostilities provide exaggerated figures while independent
monitors are stymied by the violence and shifting battle lines.").
19. Samy Magdy, Report: Death toll from Yemen's war hit 100,000 since 2015,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 31, 2019), https://apnews.com/b7f039269a394b7aa2b46430e3d9b6bc.
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Aside from the deaths caused by the pummeling of bombs, the United
Nations has declared the situation arising out of the Yemen conflict to be
"the world's worst humanitarian crisis." 20 The Saudi-led bombing
campaign has decimated civilian infrastructure such as hospitals, schools,
and avenues for humanitarian aid.21 The war has forced more than four
million Yemenis to flee from their homes, pushed between eight and ten
million people to the brink of famine, and has reduced four in five
Yemenis to such grave poverty that they require humanitarian assistance
for survival.22 The war's destruction also led to the world's worst modern
outbreak of cholera, which has disproportionately struck the children of
Yemen. 3
As a United Nations humanitarian chief explained, "This is not an
unforeseen or coincidental result of forces beyond our control. It is a
direct consequence of the actions of the parties and supporters of the
conflict." 2 4 Of course, a certain amount of civilian harm is foreseeable in
any conflict, but some harms are illegal and demand accountability.
B. A BriefHistory of the U.S. Role
Before delving into the potential liability of U.S. companies for such
harm, it is important to look at the context of overall U.S. participation in
the conflict. When the Saudi-led coalition launched its intervention in
Yemen's civil war, then-President Obama authorized U.S. logistical
support.25 This included U.S. formation of the "Joint Combined Planning
Cell" in Riyadh to provide the coalition with operational advice in

20. U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks to the Pledging Conference on Yemen (Apr. 3, 2018)
(transcript available at https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2020-06-02/remarksyemen-pledging-conference).
21. Larry Lewis, Promoting Civilian Protection SecurityAssistance: Learningfrom Yemen,
CNA 7 (May 2019), https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IRM-2019-U-019749-Final.pdf.

22. Crisis

in

Yemen,

OXFAM

INT'L,

https://www.oxfam.org/en/what-we&

do/emergencies/crisis-yemen; About OCHA Yemen, U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, https://www.unocha.org/yemen/about-ocha-yemen; Daniel Nikbakht
Sheena McKenzie, The Yemen war is the world's worst humanitarian crisis, UN says, CNN
(Apr. 3, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/03/middleeast/yemen-worlds-worsthumanitarian-crisis-un-intl/index.html.
23. Kate Lyons, Yemen's cholera outbreaknow the worst in history as millionth case looms,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2017, 10:34 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/

2017/oct/12/yemen-cholera-outbreak-worst-in-history-

1-million-cases-by-end-of-year.

24. Alexandra Zavis & Zayd Ahmed, U.S. arms sold to Saudis are killing civilians in

Yemen. Now the Trump administration is set to sell them more, L.A. TIMES (June 13, 2017),
https://www.latimes.com/ world/middleeast/la-fg-yemen-us-arms-2017-story.html.
25. Id.; Bernadette Meehan, NSC Spokesperson, Statement on the Situation in Yemen,
WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY (Mar. 25, 2015) (transcript available at

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/25/statement-nsc-spokespersonbernadette-meehan-situation-yemen)).
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support of its activities, and the U.S. military initiated further support via
intelligence sharing and mid-air refueling of coalition jets. 26
Perhaps the most significant source of U.S. support for the Yemen war
lies in its pipeline of weapons and equipment to the Saudi-led coalition.
The Obama administration's offer of arms support to the Saudis
ballooned to more than $115 billion worth of weaponry by the time
President Obama left office, 7 much of it intended to replenish Saudi
stockpiles used up in the Yemen conflict. 28 At the time, this was the
largest amount of arms sales to Saudi Arabia under any president in U.S.
history. 29 As the Saudi-led coalition's activities went "off the rails," as
described by at least one former official, 30 some within the Obama
administration began to fear legal consequences for complicity in the
destruction. 3 1 Eventually, the Obama administration decided to suspend
sales of precision-guided munitions to the Saudis. 3 2
The Trump administration quickly reversed this decision upon taking
office, announcing a massive new arms deal. 33 Since the coalition entered
the Yemen conflict in March of 2015, the U.S. has struck deals amounting
to at least $68 billion with the two leading coalition partners orchestrating
the airstrikes, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 34 The United

26. Lewis, supra note 22, at 7. The United States has since ceased the practice of mid-air
refueling. Phil Stewart, U.S. halting refueling of Saudi-led coalition aircraft in Yemen's war,
REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2018, 6:06 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-yemen-refueling/u-s-

halting-refueling-of-saudi-led-coalition-aircraft-in-yemens-war-idUSKCNNE2LJ.
27. Yara Bayoumy, Obama administration arms sales offers to Saudi top $115 billion:
report, REUTERS (Sept. 7, 2016, 3:24 PM,), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-saudi-security

/obama-administration-arms-sales-offers-to-saudi-top- 115-billion-report-idUSKCN

11D2JQ.

28. William D. Hartung, U.S. Arms Transfers to Saudi Arabia and the War in Yemen,
SECURITY ASSISTANCE MONITOR (Sept. 7, 2016), http://securityassistance.org/factsheet/us-arms-

transfers-saudi-arabia-and-war-yemen.
29. Id.
30. Nicolas Niarchos, How the US. is Making the War in Yemen Worse, NEW YORKER (Jan.

15, 2018) (quoting a former State Department official during the Obama administration: "It got
to the point where the Saudi intervention was going so off the rails it was destroying the
country."), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/22/how-the-us-is-making-the-war-in
-yemen-worse.
31. Warren Strobel & Jonathan Landay, Exclusive: As Saudis bombed Yemen, U.S. worried
about legal blowback, REUTERS (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-saudi-

yemen-idUSKCN12AOBQ.
32. Missy Ryan & Anne Gearan, Trump administration looks to resume Saudi arms sales

criticized as endangering civilians in Yemen,
WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2017),
https ://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-looks-to-resume
-saudi-arms-sale-criticized-as-endangering-civilians-in-yemen/2017/03/08/a259090a-040e-11 e7
-b 1e9-a05d3c2 lf7cfstory.html?utm_term=.940433781963.
33. Id.
34. Frank Andrews, Revealed: the full extent of US arms deals with Saudi Arabia and UAE,
MIDDLE EAST EYE (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/revealed-full-extent-us-

arms-deals-saudi-arabia-and-uae.
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States has warned that the coalition should not expect a "blank che[ck]]"
of support. 35 Yet more than three years have passed since that warning,
and the U.S. government continues to provide arms and assistance as the
Yemen war rages on.
In the face of congressional pushback, 36 the Trump administration
went so far as to declare an emergency under the auspices of the Arms
Export Control Act in order to bypass congressional oversight of rampedup arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates totaling more
than $8 billion in May of 2019.37
The U.N. Eminent Expert report bemoaned the "pervasive lack of
accountability" that has surrounded the parties to the Yemen conflict for
the serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights
law. 3 8 Further, the panel called upon third party states to stop funneling
weapons into the conflict, as it exacerbates the suffering and places third
parties at risk of becoming accessories to war crimes. 39
II. THE ALIEN TORTS STATUTE: AN AVENUE OF ACCOUNTABILITY?
An avenue for accountability that has not yet been explored is
40
litigation under the Alien Tort Statute in U.S. courts. While the U.S.
35. Patrick Wintour, US says supportfor Saudi Arabia not a 'blank cheque' after Yemen
air raid, GUARDIAN (Oct. 9, 2016,), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/09/saudi-

arabia-investigate-air-raid-on-funeral-in-yemen.
36. In April 2019, Congress invoked for the first time a provision of the War Powers
Resolution to end U.S. involvement in the Yemen War. President Trump vetoed the measure.
Mark Landler & Peter Baker, Trump Vetoes Measure to ForceEnd to U.S. Involvement in Yemen
War, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/16/us/politics/trump-vetoyemen.html.

37. SECURITY ASSISTANCE MONITOR, PRESIDENT TRUMP BYPASSES CONGRESS (June 5,
2019), http://securityassistance.org/fact sheet/president-trump-expedites-arms-saudi-arabia-uae;
A bipartisan group of lawmakers introduced measures to block these emergency sales, stating that
"selling more bombs to the Saudis simply means that the famine and cholera outbreak in Yemen
will get worse, Iran will get stronger, and Al Qaeda and ISIS will continue to flourish amidst the
chaos of the civil war. Saudi Arabia treats us like the junior partner in this relationship, chopping
up U.S. residents and torturing others, all the while demanding we remain silent and sell them
more weapons. The U.S.-Saudi relationship needs to change, and it's clear that only Congress can
make that happen." Menendez, Graham, Murphy, Paul, Leahy, Young, Reed Announce 22 Joint
Resolutions to Block Weapons Sales to Saudi Arabia and UAE Without CongressionalApproval

(June
5, 2019), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/menendez-grahammurphy-paul-leahy-young-reed-announce-22-joint-resolutions-to-block-weapons-sales-to-saudiarabia-and-uae-without-congressional-approval; The Trump administration also vetoed these
congressional attempts to override the sales. Michael D. Shear & Catie Edmonson, Trump Vetoes
BipartisanResolutions Blocking Arms Sales to GulfNations, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2019).
38. GRP. OF EMINENT EXPERTS, supra note 14, at 2.
39. Id.

40. Other efforts abound to stop the carnage in Yemen and hold those responsible
accountable. In Europe, streams of litigation have launched, and some have been met with initial
success in challenging government licensing of arms sales to Saudi Arabia for use in the Yemen

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol31/iss2/1
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government is likely immune from most litigation arising from its
complicity in the conflict, an individual directly impacted by the U.S.backed, Saudi-led coalition airstrikes in Yemen may have a successful
claim under the ATS for damages in U.S. courts against a weapons
manufacturer for aiding and abetting war crimes in Yemen by knowingly
providing the weapons used by the coalition to target civilians. 4 1
A. ATS Precedent
As courts have noted when examining its text, the brevity of the ATS
"belies the magnitude of its implications."42 Its mere thirty-three words
are contained within the first Judiciary Act passed in 1789: "[t]he district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States." 43
The modern era of ATS litigation was born with Filartigav. PenaIrela in 1980 when the Second Circuit ruled that foreign national
plaintiffs could bring torts claims under the ATS alleging violations of
customary international law.44 The court reasoned that the modern human
rights abuser was "like the pirate and slave trader before him . . . an
enemy of all mankind" and that this decision would be a "small but
important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people
from brutal violence." 4 5

war. See Amnesty Int'l, Outsourcing Responsibility: Human Rights Policies in the Defence
Sector, 48-50 (Sept. 2019), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ACT300893
2019ENGLISH.PDF; Dan Sabbagh, Beth McKernan, UK arms sales to Saudi Arabia unlawful,
court of appeal declares, GUARDIAN (June 20, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2019/

jun/20/uk-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-for-use-in-yemen-declared-unlawful. Many nations, including
Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Finland have stopped licensing arms sales to Saudi
Arabia due to the ongoing massacre of civilians in Yemen. Jon Stone, Germany, Denmark
Netherlands and Finland stop weapons sales to Saudi Arabia in response to Yemen Famine,
INDEPENDENT (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/saudi-arabia-

arms-embargo-weapons-europe-germany-denmark-uk-yemen-war-famine-a8648611 html. In the
United States, political pressure has been mounting to stop support for the Saudi-led coalition's
activities in Yemen, culminating in the first-ever congressional invocation of the War Powers
Resolution to call for an end of U.S. involvement in the hostilities, and efforts to block
unauthorized sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, but both were ultimately
unsuccessful attempts. Landler & Baker, supra note 37.

41. Oona A. Hathaway, Aaron Haviland, Srinath Reddy Kethireddy, Alyssa T. Yamamoto,
Yemen: Is the U.S. Breakingthe Law?, 10 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 1, 51 (2019) ("Although sovereign
immunity protects officials and States involved in the Saudi-led coalition from suit under the ATS,
U.S. corporations that manufacture and supply weapons to the coalition could potentially be liable
for aiding and abetting violations committed using those weapons.").
42. In re XE Servs. Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d 569, 577 (E.D. Va. 2009).

43. Alien's action for tort, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1350.

44. Filartigav. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
45. Id. at 890.
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A flood of ATS litigation opened after this decision. 46 But since then,
the Supreme Court has placed additional contours and constraints upon
the ATS's scope. In 2004, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 47 the Court
determined that the ATS's original reach was intended to extend to
offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and piracy, and
that modern claims under the statute may therefore only be cognizable if
they are binding norms with no "less definite content and acceptance
among civilized nations" than those originally contemplated. 48 Sosa left
the door open to ATS claims alleging breaches of "definable, universal,
and obligatory norms." 49
The Supreme Court again addressed the Alien Tort Statute in 2013
with Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 50 This time, the majority
determined that a presumption against extraterritorial application of
statutes extends to the ATS, but again left the door open to cases in which
claims "touch and concern the territory of the United States . . . with
sufficient force to displace the presumption. " In 2018, the Court further
narrowed the scope of ATS liability in Jesner v. Arab Bank by prohibiting
claims against foreign corporations.5 2
B. Potential Plaintiffs
There are, unfortunately, quite a few potential plaintiffs who may be
poised to bring an ATS claim against a U.S. company for aiding and
abetting war crimes. On March 15, 2016, two airstrikes detonated bombs
made by General Dynamics and guided by a Boeing-made system in a
46. See CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, CREATIVE LEGAL STRATEGIES (July 14,

2015), https://ccrjustice.org/home/how-we-work/creative-legal-strategies
("Filirtiga v. PefiaIrala ushered in a new era in human rights law, spawning a legal movement for transnational
justice and accountability.").
47. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
48. Id. at 732.

49. Id. The Sosa holding determined that arbitrary arrest and detention did not meet this
standard.
50. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
51. Id. at 133. In their concurring opinion, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan
disagreed with the presumption against extraterritoriality approach and recommended an alternate
test. (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Unlike the Court, I would not invoke the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Rather, guided in part by principles and practices of foreign relations law, I
would find jurisdiction under this statute where (1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2)
the defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant's conduct substantially and adversely
affects an important American national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing
the United States from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a
tortureror other common enemy of mankind.").

52. Jesner v. Arab Bank, 138 U.S. 1386, 1401 (2018). Though three justices would have
closed off ATS claims against corporate defendants entirely, the majority holding pointed to
foreign policy questions uniquely posed by foreign corporate defendants and excluded them from
ATS liability as a matter of judicial caution.
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crowded marketplace, killing at least 97 civilians, including 25 children. 53
On April 22, 2018, the coalition hurled a Raytheon-manufactured bomb
at a wedding party, killing 21 civilians, including 11 children.54 In
October 2017, the coalition struck a funeral hall with a Raytheon-made
bomb, killing more than 140 mourners and wounding at least 500 more, 5
in what a senior State Department official called a "foolish strike" that
reportedly "appalled" U.S. officials. 56
But perhaps the most egregious instance ripe for an ATS claim
occurred on August 9, 2018. On the way to a field trip to celebrate the
end of the summer session, a school bus packed with young boys stopped
for snacks at a busy market' and was incinerated by a Saudi-led coalition
strike using a 500-pound Lockheed Martin bomb. 58 The boys' teacher
survived the attack: "I heard a loud explosion, and there was dust and
smoke everywhere," he said. "The scene can't be described-there was
body parts and blood everywhere." 59
For purposes of this Article, we will use this as a test case by
imagining that our hypothetical plaintiff is a surviving close relative of
one of the decedent children struck by the bomb on the school bus. To

53.

2016),

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, YEMEN: US BOMBS USED IN DEADLIEST MARKET STRIKE (Apr.

https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/07/yemen-us-bombs-used-deadliest-market-strike#.

A Saudi military spokesman insists it was a militia gathering and not a market but also
demonstrated knowledge that it was a civilian commercial area.
54. Nima Elbagir, Salma Abdelaziz, & Laura Smith-Spark, Made in America, CNN
(Sept. 2018), https://www.cnn.con/interactive/2018/09/world/yemen-airstrikes-intl/.

The Saudi

coalition initially declined to comment other than to say they would investigate. Shuaib
Almosawa, Wedding is Hit By Airstrike in Yemen, Killing More Than 20, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23,
2018),

https://www.nytimes.con/2018/04/23/world/middleeast/yemen-wedding-bombing.html.

The coalition investigations team disputed that there was a wedding taking place in the targeted
area despite widespread eyewitness accounts but admitted that rules of engagement were not
followed. Mwatana, supranote 4, 73-78.
55. Niarchos, supra note 30.

56. The Saudi coalition at first denied responsibility for this strike before admitting that it
had indeed conducted the bombing but blame poor intelligence. Id. Human rights groups say that
information showing there was a widely-attended funeral was publicly available, and the coalition
should have known it was a civilian gathering. Yemen: Saudi-Led FuneralAttack Apparent War
Crime, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 13, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/

10/13/yemen-saudi-led-funeral-attack-apparent-war-crime.
57. Rasha Mohamed, It's time for the U.S. to stop supplying weapons to the Saudi-led
coalition in Yemen, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost com/news/

democracy-post/wp/2018/08/31/its-time-for-the-u-s-to-stop-supplying-weapons-to-the-saudi-led
-coalition-in-yemen/.
58. Nima Elbagir, Salma Abdelaziz, Sheena McKenzie, & Waffa Munayyer, The
schoolboys on afield trip in Yemen were chatting and laughing. Then came the airstrike, CNN
(Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.cnn.con/2018/08/13/middleeast/yemen-children-school-bus-strikeintl/index.html.
59. Id.
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that end, we turn next to identifying the hurdles that our plaintiff must
overcome.
III. THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE
A. Hurdle One: Can the PlaintiffSupport Claims that Meet the Sosa
Test?
Our plaintiff must first establish that the underlying alleged tortious
conduct-in this case, violations of international humanitarian law
amounting to war crimes-constitutes an actionable breach of the "law
of nations" under the ATS. 60 Sosa's test insists that the norm breached
must be as "definable, universal, and obligatory" in customary
international law as those originally contemplated by the Alien Tort
Statute.6 1
1. War Crimes
The substantive rules of international humanitarian law set forward
principles of armed conflict that balance military needs with
humanitarian concerns. 62 Hostilities between states and non-state actors
are characterized as non-international armed conflicts and are governed
by treaty obligations, including Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions and the Second Additional Protocol of 1977, as well as
customary international law. 63 Under these rules, attacks on military
targets that are indiscriminate (not specifically targeted to the military
objective), as well as attacks that are disproportionate (causing excessive
civilian casualties relative to the military advantage), are also prohibited.
Serious violations of international humanitarian law, such as intentional
or reckless attacks directed at civilians, amount to war crimes. 64
To discern whether these rules have ripened into customary
international law ("the law of nations") sufficient to pass the Sosa test,
we assess whether there is a widespread practice among states acting
under a sense of legal obligation. 65 Virtually every country in the world
60. Notably, our corporate defendant is accused of aiding and abetting these atrocities, not
of directly committing them. Nonetheless, we must first assess whether the underlying violation
passes muster.
61. Sosav. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
62. GRP. OF EMINENT EXPERTS, supra note 14.
63. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW? 1
(2004), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/whatisihl.pdf. Note that the United
States has signed but not ratified the second Additional Protocol.
64. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW,

Ch. 44, Rule 156 (https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/vl_chachapter44_rule
156.
65. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945 ("The Court,

whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted
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is a party to the Geneva Conventions, setting forth the rules of
international humanitarian law.66 Numerous international criminal
tribunals have included jurisdiction for prosecution of war crimes,
including Nuremberg,6 7 the International Criminal Court, 8 the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, 69 the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 70 and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda.7 1 The U.N. Secretary-General has noted that these rules are
considered "beyond any doubt customary law." 72 U.S. courts have indeed
consistently held that the prohibition against war crimes is sufficiently
specific, universal, and obligatory within customary international law as

to it, shall apply... international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.");
Continental Shelf case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), Judgement, 1985, ICJ 29-30 ("It is of
course axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be looked for primarily in
the actual practice and opinio juris of States."); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §
102 (1987) ("Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation."); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900) ("...resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of
these, to the works of jurists and commentators who by years of labor, research, and experience
have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such
works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning
what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.").
66. INTERNATIONAL
COMMENTARIES:

COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS,

GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF

1949

TREATIES,

STATE PARTIES AND

AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, AND THEIR

COMMENTARIES (2019), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreaties1949.xsp.

67. Charter of the IMT, art. 6(b), Aug. 8, 1945 (establishing jurisdiction over "war crimes:
namely, violations of the laws or customs of war").
68. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(a), July 17, 1998

(establishing war crimes as one of the "most serious crimes of concern to the international
community").

69. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N.-Sierra Leone, art. 1(1), Aug. 14,
2020 ("The Special Court shall... have the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law.").
70. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, art. 1, May 25, 1993 [hereinafter ICTY] ("The [ICTY] shall have the
power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian
law...").

71. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and
Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, Between 1 January 1994
and 31 December 1994, art. 4, 1994 [hereinafter ICTR] (establishing "the power to prosecute
persons committing or ordering to be committed serious violations of Article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions ... and of Additional Protocol II thereto.").
72. U.N. Secretary-General, Pursuantto Paragraph2 of the Security CouncilResolution
808, ¶ 34 S/25704 (May 3, 1993), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_
re808_1993_en.pdf.
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to pass the standard set forth by Sosa to establish a claim under the Alien
Tort Statute. 73
Once establishing that the underlying wrongful act of war crimes
passes the Sosa test, our plaintiff must next apply the law to the facts of
this case. As this war is between the government of Yemen and the
Houthis, a non-state armed group, the Yemen war qualifies as a noninternational armed conflict. 74 The members of the Saudi-led coalition
entered the armed conflict as cobelligerents when they initiated their
intervention into the fighting on the side of the Yemeni government in
March 2015.75 As such, all parties to the Yemen conflict are bound by the
applicable rules of international humanitarian law. This means that to
prove that the airstrike constituted a war crime, the plaintiff in our case
must show that the Saudi-led coalition: (1) had the purpose of killing
civilians; (2) knew that the probable consequence of the strike would be
to kill civilians in violation of the principle of distinction; or (3) knew
that the probable consequence of the strike would be to kill civilians in
violation of the principle of proportionality.76
Though establishing the necessary facts will be one of the more
difficult components of our plaintiffs case, there is nonetheless ample
evidence in support. Leading human rights observers believe the strike in
our test case that demolished a school bus packed with young boys in
August 2018 constitutes a war crime. 77 Witness descriptions indicate that
the bomb struck a crowded market in Dahyan, landing right next to the
bus, which was parked at a grocery store on the way to the field trip. 7 8
The International Committee of the Red Cross' delegation to Yemen
reported that 51 died in that strike and that 79 were wounded. 79 Reports
indicate that at least 40 of the dead were children8 0 and that most were
under the age of 10.81 Aerial footage of the strike location at the time and
date of the attack demonstrates that a hovering aircraft could have clearly
73. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 74 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1996); Warfaa v. Ali, 811 F.3d 653,
658 (4th Cir. 2016); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011); In re Chiquita Brands

Intern., Inc. Alien Tort Statute and Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (S.D.
Fla. 2011).
74. GRP. OF EMINENT EXPERTS, supra note 143, at 12.
75. Id.
76. See Ryan Goodman, Explainer: What Mental State is Required to Commit a War
Crime?, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/32644/explainer-mental-

state-required-commit-war-crime/.
77. See, e.g., Yemen: CoalitionBus Bombing Apparent War Crime, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Sept. 2, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/20 18/09/02/yemen-coalition-bus-bombing

-apparent-war-crime.
78. Id.
79. Elbagir et al., supra note 18.
80. Id.

81. Johannes Bruwer (@JohannesBruwerl)

TWITTER

(Aug.

9, 2018 5:15

AM),

https://twitter.com/JohannesBruwerl/status/1027483425287143427.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol31/iss2/1

14

Beavers: War Crimes, Inc.: The ATS Case against the U.S. Weapons Industry

WAR CRIMES, INC.

2020]

193

seen a bustling road with civilian traffic before striking.8 2 This indicates
that the coalition knew or should have known the bomb would
disproportionately kill civilians, serving as evidence of the required mens
rea to establish a war crime.
The coalition's own account of this strike has changed many times.
Despite video evidence to the contrary, 83 the Saudi-led coalition first
disputed that there were children on the bus 84 and insisted that the "attack
in Saada was a legitimate military operation . . . and was carried out in
accordance with international humanitarian law." 85 Later, the coalition
agreed to investigate the strike.86 An investigation team set up by the
Saudi-led coalition then admitted that the location of the strike resulted
in "unjustifiable" collateral damage, 87 but insisted that the bus was
nonetheless a legitimate target by alleging there was a Houthi leader
onboard. 88 As the United Nations Panel of Eminent Experts noted, in
addition to concerns about the impartiality and thoroughness of the
coalition's investigations team, this explanation fails to account for the
principle of proportionality by claiming a single Houthi leader, even if
actually on board the bus, would justify a strike placing dozens of
civilians, mostly children, at risk. 89 The coalition ultimately noted
"mistakes in compliance to the rules of engagement" but said that the bus
should have been targeted in a more open area, not that it shouldn't have
been struck at all. 90
82. Michael Cruickshank, A Saudi War-Crime in Yemen?, BELLINGCAT (Aug. 18, 2018)
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/08/18/19432/.
83. Elbagir et al., supra note 59.

84. Hakim Almasmari et al., Saudi-led strike kills dozens of children on schoolfield trip in
Yemen, CNN (Aug. 10, 2018), https://edition.cnn.com/2018/08/09/middleeast/yemen-bus-intl/
index.html.

85. Dozens killed including children on a bus, in Yemen air strikes, REUTERS (Aug. 9, 2018
5:40 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security/dozens-killed-including-childrenin-yemen-air-strikes-idUSKBN1KU 12U.
86. Saudi-UAE coalition admits Yemen school bus attack 'unjustified,' AL JAZEERA
(Sept. 1, 2018) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/09/saudi-uae-coalition-admits-yemenschool-bus-bombing-unjustified-180901141048148.htm. Many have noted concerns about the
impartiality of the coalition's investigation team, see Human Rights Watch, Hiding Behind the
Coalition (Aug. 24, 2018),

https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/24/hiding-behind-coalition/

failure-credibly-investigate-and-provide-redress-unlawful.
87. AL JAZEERA, supra note 87.
88. Yemen conflict: Saudi-led coalition admits mistakes in deadly bus strike, BBC NEWS
(Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45382561.
89. GRP. OF EMINENT EXPERTS, supra note 14, at 112.

90. Salma Abdelaziz, Alla Eshchenko & Joe Sterling, Saudi-led coalition admits 'mistakes'
made in deadly bus attack in Yemen, CNN (Sept. 2, 2018 6:15 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018

/09/01/middleeast/saudi-coalition-yemen-attack/index.html. Eyewitnesses dispute the possibility
that there could have been a military target on board the bus or nearby at all: "All of those who
died were residents, children and shop owners." REUTERS, supra note 86. "I am really shocked
because there is no military base or troops in that area," said the Red Crescent office director.
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"Grotesque, shameful, indignant. Blatant disregard for rules of war
when a bus carrying innocent school children is fair game for attack,"
said the head of the Norwegian Refugee Council. 9 1 "Attacking children
is the lowest any party of this conflict can go," said the UNICEF Yemen
Resident Representative; "[t]here is no justification whatsoever to
attacking children."92

2. Aiding and Abetting
Establishing that the coalition strike in question constituted a violation
of the law of nations in keeping with Sosa is merely the first step, as it is
the underlying harm upon which our plaintiff's claim is based. The next
hurdle is determining whether aiding and abetting also meets the Sosa
"Why would they carry out such an action?" Ali Al-Mujahed & Sudarsan Raghavan, Airstrike by
U.S.-backed Saudi coalition on bus kills dozens of Yemeni children, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2018),
https ://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/airstrike-by-us-ally-on-bus-carrying-yeme
ni-children-kills-and-wounds-scores/20 18/08/09/c047e5 5e-bbc6-42ff-a5db -4bd2e629f0b6_
story.html.
91. REUTERS, supra note 86.
92. UN. chiefcondemns air strike that hit school bus in northern Yemen, killing scores of
children,U.N. NEWS (Aug. 9, 2018), https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/08/1016732.

93. Naif Rahma, Mourners attenda funeral in August for people, mainly children, killed in
a Saudi-led coalition airstrike on a bus in northern Yemen, WASH. POST (Sept. 1, 2018, 12:58
P.M. CST), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-rare-admission-saudi-ledcoalition-says-airstrike-killed-yemeni-children-last-month/2018/09/01/lcbdc878-ae06-11
e8-8a

Oc-70b618c98d3c_story.html?noredirect=on.
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standard and whether the defendant corporation indeed aided and abetted
the underlying war crime.
Courts have uniformly found aiding and abetting to be a viable cause
of action under the Alien Tort Statute. 94 In so holding, they have looked
to the wealth of evidence that, at the time of ATS' passage, aiding and
abetting was recognized as a violation of the law of nations. Indeed, a
long American legal tradition has recognized secondary liability for
international law violations both in common law 95 and in statutes. 96
An abundance of state practice and opinion juris demonstrates aiding
and abetting liability as a matter of customary international law. PostWorld War II tribunals recognized criminal responsibility for aiding and
abetting as a core principle. 97 The London Charter set forth liability for
"accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common
plan or conspiracy to commit" other crimes subject to the Tribunal's
jurisdiction. The Nuremberg Principles Resolution, codifying principles
emerging from the London Charter and the Nuremberg trials, established
that "[c]omplicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war
crime, or a crime against humanity . . is a crime under international
law." 98 U.S. courts have recognized these decisions as authoritative

94. See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ("Virtually every court
to address the issue, before and after Sosa, has so held, recognizing secondary liability for
violations of international law since the founding of the Republic."); see also Bowoto v. Chevron
Corp., 2006 WL 2455752 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (noting that the vast majority of courts to have

considered the issue have found that aiding and abetting liability is available under the ATS, a
trend that survived the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa).
95. See, e.g., Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 167-68, 1 L. Ed. 540 (1795) (Iredell,
J.); The Amiable Nancy, 1 F. Cas. 765, 768 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1817) (No. 331); Henfield's Case, 11 F.
Cas. 1099 (C.C.D.Pa.1793) (No. 6,360).

96. Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, § 10, 1 Stat. 112, 114 (1790) (deeming "an accessary [sic]
to ... piracies" anyone who "knowingly and willingly aided" piracy). There is evidence that aiding
and abetting liability for private actors for violating international law was well understood at the
time of the ATS' passage. Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 59 (1795).
97. Khulamani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J.,
concurring).
98.

INT'L LAW COMMISSION, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW RECOGNIZED IN THE

CHARTER OF THE NURNBERG TRIBUNAL AND IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIBUNAL, Principle VII

(1950), https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/7_1_1950.pdf. Similarly,
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda extended responsibility to "person who planned, instigated, ordered,
committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution" of a crime,
recognizing this standard as existing customary international law. ICTY, supra note 71, at art. 7;
ICTR, supra note 72, at art. 6; Rep. of U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 73, at ¶ 39. The Rome

Statute for the International Criminal Court recognizes liability for aiding and abetting, and
tribunals have convicted individuals for secondary liability of war crimes. Rome Statute, supra
note 69, art. 25(3)(c).
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sources of customary international law. 99 Specifically, in the context of
corporate aiding and abetting of war crimes, the International Committee
of the Red Cross has concluded that "an arms dealer who sells weapons
to a client knowing that the weapons are to be used to commit war crimes
is complicit in the crimes, regardless of whether he or she shares the
client's motivations." 10 0
Despite the widespread recognition of aiding and abetting as a vehicle
for liability under the ATS under the Sosa standard, courts remain split
on the appropriate standard to apply, creating another hurdle for our
hypothetical plaintiff.101 The majority of courts recognizing aiding and
abetting as actionable under the ATS have adopted the "knowledge"
standard set forth by most international tribunals. 10 2 Under this standard,
the plaintiff must show there was "knowing practical assistance or
encouragement that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the
crime." 103 Conversely, the Second and Fourth Circuits have adopted the
more restrictive "purpose" standard of the Rome Statute, creating the
International Criminal Court, which only recognizes aiding and abetting
liability when the defendant's actions are "for the purpose of facilitating
the commission" of violations of the law of nations. 104
Many experts believe that the "purpose" test is inappropriate for ATS
litigation and that the "knowledge" mens rea element should govern
standard. 10 5 This argument is persuasive, as international criminal
tribunals have consistently asserted that customary international law
simply requires the "knowledge" standard. Further, the U.S. Department
of Defense's own regulations indicate that knowledge alone is sufficient;
99. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 610 & n.40, (2006); Princz v. Federal
Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C. Cir.1994); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414
F.3d 233, 244 n.18 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 105 nn.39-40 (2d Cir.
2003).

100. Amnesty Int'l, Outsourcing Responsibility: Human Rights Policies in the Defence
Sector (ACT 30/0893/2019 (Sept. 2019). Note also that the Arms Trade Treaty requires states to

refrain from transferring arms if they have knowledge that they will be used for war crimes. The
United States is a signatory to the Arms Trade Treaty but has not ratified it. Arms Trade Treaty,
art. 6-7, Dec. 2014.
101. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258-59 (2d

Cir. 2009) (requiring that a defendant act with purpose to meet the mens rea element of aiding
and abetting liability); but see Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1158-59 (11th Cir.

2005) (identifying knowledge of illegality as sufficient).
102. Oona Hathaway et al., The High Hurdlefor Aiding and Abetting Unlawful Attacks in
Yemen, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/54720/high-hurdle-aidingabetting-unlawful-attacks-yemen/.
103. John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 947 (9th Cir. 2002).
104. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir.
2009); Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 399-400 (4th Cir. 2011).

105. See Brief of David J. Scheffer, Director of the Center for International Human Rights
as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, Presbyterian Church of Sudan
v. Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 09-1202).
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the prosecution in the 9/11 case against Khalid Sheik Mohamed et al. in
the military commissions relying on the knowledge standard for aiding
and abetting, arguing that it was supported by customary international
law.106

106. Ryan Goodman, The Law ofAiding andAbetting (Alleged) War Crimes: How to Assess
US and UK Support for Saudi Strikes in Yemen, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 1, 2016),
https://www.justsecurity.org/32656/law-aiding-abetting-alleged-war-crimes-assess-uk-supportsaudi-strikes-yemen/. If our plaintiff's claim were to come before a court that instead adopted the
higher threshold of the "purpose" mens rea standard, the hurdle would become more difficult to
clear but there is precedent to suggest it may nonetheless prevail. In the case of Doe v. Nestle
USA, Inc., the Ninth Circuit found in an ATS case that Nestle had aided and abetted slavery in the
Ivory Coast by supporting farmers utilizing child labor to harvest cocoa. Doe v. Nestle USA, Inc.,
766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014). The court determined that Nestle's mens rea was sufficient under
either the purpose or knowledge standard. Id. at 1026. In establishing that the conduct was
purposeful, the court reasoned that the "defendants placed increased revenues before basic human
welfare." Id. at 1024. The court went on to explain, "Driven by the goal to reduce costs in any
way possible, the defendants allegedly supported the use of child slavery, the cheapest form of
labor available. These allegations explain how the use of child slavery benefitted the defendants
and furthered their operational goals in the Ivory Coast, and therefore, the allegations support the
inference that the defendants acted with the purpose to facilitate child slavery." Id. The Doe court
further distinguished this case from PresbyterianChurch ofSudan v. Talisman EnergyInc. where

the Fourth Circuit found that the "purpose" mens rea standard was not met in another case where
the defendant corporation's product was allegedly used to harm the civilian population. The
company in that case built roads in Sudan to support an oil extraction project and the roads were
also used for military activities. The court explained in making the distinction that "the defendant
did not in any way benefit from the underlying human rights atrocities...and in fact, those atrocities
ran contrary to the defendant's goals in the area, and even forced the defendant to abandon its
operations." Id. In deciding Doe, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that while the mens rea element
would not be "satisfied merely because the defendants intended to profit by doing business in the
Ivory Coast," purpose may be inferred by the corporation declining to use its power to stop the
underlying wrongs. Id. at 1025. Our plaintiff may seek to employ similar rationale by arguing that
the contractor defendant's goals are furthered by Saudi atrocities and that they continue to
purposefully facilitate them by aggressively pursuing expanded sales without leveraging their role
to impose corresponding civilian protection requirements. Indeed, the Yemen war has become a
cash cow for the U.S. weapons industry. Alex Kane, Here's Exactly Who's ProfitingFrom the
War on Yemen, IN THESE TiMEs (May 20, 2019), https://inthesetimes.com/features/us-saudi-

arabia-yemen-war-arms-sales.html ("The war in Yemen has been particularly lucrative for
General Dynamics, Boeing and Raytheon, which have received hundreds of millions of dollars in
Saudi weapons deals. All three corporations have highlighted business with Saudi Arabia in their
reports to shareholders. Since the war began in March 2015, General Dynamics' stock price has
risen from about $135 to $169 per share, Raytheon's from about $108 to more than $180, and

Boeing's from about $150 to $360.") Lockheed Martin's growth as a company depends heavily
on increasing sales to the Saudis. Lockheed created a division in 2013 devoted solely to foreign
military sales, and the company's chief executive, Marillyn Hewson, has said that Lockheed needs
to increase foreign business-with a goal of global arms sales becoming 25% to 30% of its
revenue. Aaron Gregg & Christian Davenport, Defense contractorsstand with White House on
Saudi arms sales, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.con/

business/20 18/10/25/defense-contractors-stand-with-white-house-saudi-arms-sales/ ("Lockheed
has made selling to foreign governments a key target for growth. Earlier this year, Hewson said
her company's international sales had jumped from 17 percent of total sales in 2013 to 30 percent
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Turning first to the actus reus, available sources evidence suggests
that a plaintiff in our case might utilize to show that the defendant
corporation substantially assisted in the underlying indiscriminate strike
in multiple instances throughout the Yemen conflict. American weapons
manufacturers have been called the "backbone" of the Saudi-led
coalition's war crimes in Yemen, and experts believe the coalition's
atrocities would be impossible without the funnel of arms provided by
these U.S. companies. 107 More than 90% of U.S. arms offers made to
Saudi Arabia over the past decade include the following top four
American weapons manufacturers: Boeing, General Dynamics,
Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon. 108 When pressed to answer for the
civilian deaths caused by U.S. bombs, one U.S. official bluntly stated,
"Well, what difference does that make? We are providing the refueling
and support to Saudi aircraft. We are also selling them munition. . . We
are not denying that." 109

in 2017. Saudi Arabia played a key role in that growth, she said, and made it clear that the
relationship would continue."). Lockheed Martin spent more than $13 million in its lobbying
efforts in 2018 alone, much of it focused on protecting and expanding its foreign military sales,
and at least one prominent U.S. lobbying firm represents both Saudi Arabia and Lockheed Martin.
Client Profile: Lockheed Martin, OPEN SECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/client
sum.php?id=D000000104&year=2018 (last visited July 16, 2019); Mashal Hashem & James
Allen, The lobbyists who profit from war crimes in Yemen, NAT'L MEMO (May 18, 2019),
https ://www.nationalmemo.com/the-lobbyists-who-profit-from-war-crimes-in-yemen/?cn-reload
ed=1. There is no publicly available evidence that Lockheed Martin or Raytheon have pursued
measures to condition their sales on the coalition's compliance with international humanitarian
law. Our plaintiff may point to these Herculean efforts to expand their weapons pipeline to Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates without corresponding civilian protection measures as
evidence that the defendant company views the continued brutality of the Yemen war is essential
to its expanded growth and thus is purposefully aiding and abetting the coalition's war crimes by
continuing to sell the weapons that perpetuate the conflict.
107. Meet the Senator Trying to End US. Supportfor the War in Yemen, INTERCEPT (Sept.
13, 2018, 6:01 AM), https://theintercept.com/2018/09/13/meet-the-senator-trying-to-end-u-s-

support-for-the-war-in-yemen/ ("If the United States of America and the United Kingdom,
tonight, told King Salman, 'This war has to end,' it would end tomorrow. Because the Royal Saudi
Air Force cannot operate without American & British support."); Samuel Oakford and Peter
Salisbury, Yemen: The Graveyard of the Obama Doctrine, ATLANTIC (Sept. 23, 2016),
https ://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/09/yemen-saudi-arabia-obama-riyadh/5
01365/ ("The Saudis would be crippled without direct U.S. military assistance."); Alex Kane,
Here's Exactly Who's Profiting From the War on Yemen, IN THESE TIMES (June 2019),
https://inthesetimes.com/features/us-saudi-arabia-yemen-war-arms-sales.html
("The
Saudi
military has a very sophisticated, high-tech, capital-intensive military that requires almost
constant customer service . . . And so most of the planes would be grounded if Lockheed Martin
or Boeing turn off the help line.").
108. Cassandra Stimpson & William Hartung, U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia: The
Corporate Connection, CTR. FOR INT'L POLICY (2019), https://static.wixstatic.com/ugd/fb6c59_
bd62e10ae7b745069e9a6fa897de6a39.pdf.
109. Ryan, supra note 76.
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In the specific case of the Dahyan school bus strike, Lockheed
Martin's assistance was crucial to the operation, as the company
manufactured and sold the weapon to the Saudi-led coalition that was
utilized in the attack. Reporting indicates that shrapnel remnants near the
location of the bomb's impact included the front control fin of a GBU-12
Paveway II, a 500-pound laser-guided MK-82 bomb." This debris
carried a serial number that the Defense Logistic Agency's online
database confirms was manufactured by Lockheed Martin.1 " As
described earlier in this article, this is just one of many unlawful strikes
by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen in which debris remnants reveal a
reliance on U.S.-made weapons.

112

Such debris may provide evidence establishing not only that the
defendant weapons manufacturer in a similar ATS case completed the
actus reus by providing the bomb, but it also may help demonstrate that
they did so with the requisite intent under the "knowledge" standard to
complete the mens rea element. U.S. companies have been selling
weapons to Saudi Arabia and other coalition countries long before the
conflict in Yemen began. 1 3 Accordingly, bombs used in some of these
strikes may come from older stockpiles, making it difficult if not
impossible in some cases to demonstrate that Lockheed Martin,
Raytheon, or any other company knew their weapons would be used for
gross violations of the laws of war in Yemen when they originally sold

110. Elbagir et al., supra note 18.
111. Cruickshank, supra note 83.

112. Elbagir et al., supra note 18 (photograph of weapons remnant from air strike in Dahyan
bearing identification markings).
113. Hartung, supra note 29.
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them. A manufacturing date could not be found on the debris in our test
case but has been found in debris from other similarly-situated strikes.1 1 4
Nonetheless, one piece of evidence our plaintiff may draw upon to
establish the requisite "knowledge" mens rea is the fact that public
accounts of atrocities have consistently emerged since the Saudi-led
coalition began the bombing campaign in Yemen.11 5 News outlets such
1 16
as The Guardian,
The New York Times,"? and BBC News 1"' issued
public reports documenting mass civilian casualties from the earliest days
of the conflict, describing strikes on schools, mosques, and cattle
markets, 119 as well as coalition attacks that "ripped through markets,
apartment buildings, and refugee camps."120 Public-facing reporting has
only increased as the war has progressed, and U.S. weapons have played
an increasingly prominent role.12 1 Additionally, human rights groups
have published field research throughout the duration of the conflict,
documenting apparent war crimes and publicly warning that continued
arms sales would likely constitute aiding and abetting. 122 There has been
114. In our Dahyan test case, the available debris appears only to reveal that Lockheed
Martin manufactured the weapon but does not specify when it was made or sold. Some researchers
believe it may have been part of a massive transfer of arms to Saudi Arabia that was noticed to
Congress in November 2015. See Cruikshank, supra note 83. A press statement by Lockheed at
the time boasted of its sales of Paveways to foreign governments, possibly a direct reference to
the exact sale in question. LOCKHEED MARTIN, U.S. AIR FORCE AWARDS LOCKHEED MARTIN

SHARE OF PAVEWAY II PLUS LASER GUIDED BOMB CONTRACT (2015),
https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2015-10-28-U-S-Air-Force-Awards-Lockheed-Martin-MajorityShare-of-Paveway-TM-II-Plus-Laser-Guided-Bomb-Contract. But other strikes pinpoint a more
definite timeline, as they have left behind debris with markings that identify not only who made
the bomb, but when. These markings tell us that many coalition war crimes were committed with
U.S.-made bombs that were not even built until after the current conflict began and thus
necessarily were sold and transferred since that time. MWATANA FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ET AL., supra
note 5, at 15. In such cases with a definitive timeline establishing that the weapons were made
and sold after the conflict began, it will be difficult for the defendant corporation to deny that they
knew how their weapons would be used when they sold them.
MAJORITY

115. See Elbagir et al., supra note 59.
116. See, e.g., Kareem Shaheen, Air strike on Yemeni refugee camp by Saudi-led coalition
kills at least 40, GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/30/

air-strike-refugee-camp-houthi-controlled-northern-yemen-kills-at-least-21.
117. See, e.g., Saeed Al-Batati and Kareem Fahim, Rebels in Yemen Battle for Control of
Strategic Port City, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/02/world/

middleeast/dozens-of-civilians-die-in-yemen-as-factory-is-hit.html.
118. Yemencrisis: Fighting intensifies in Aden, BBC NEWS (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.bbc
.com/news/world-middle-east-32156539.

119. Id.
120. Kareem Fahim, Air strikes take toll on civilians in Yemen war, N.Y.

TIMES

(Sept. 12,

2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/13/world/middleeast/airstrikes-hit-civilians-yemenwar.html.
121. Elbagir et al., supra note 59.
122. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, supra note 41; MWATANA FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ET AL., supra
note 5; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 78.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol31/iss2/1

22

Beavers: War Crimes, Inc.: The ATS Case against the U.S. Weapons Industry

WAR CRIMES, INC.

2020]

201

enough public evidence to reportedly provoke U.S. government officials
to fear criminal liability for providing the weapons. 123 Hence the arms
suppliers must be privy to the same information.
Further hampering defense contractors' ability to claim that they do
not know that their weapons are being used to target civilians in Yemen
is the fact that they are frequently asked to comment on it. Reporters and
researchers continue to ask pointed questions to the weapons industry
about its complicity in the slaughter of civilians in Yemen. Recent
examples include Amnesty International and the Washington Post
questioning Lockheed, Raytheon, and other top weapons companies.12 4
Though the industry typically chooses to hide behind the U.S.
government in response, they do not deny knowledge.1 2 5 After the
Dahyan strike, Lockheed was specifically questioned about the use of its
126
weapon and deflected questions to the Defense Department.
B. Hurdle Two: Do the Claims Pass the Kiobel Test?
The next piece in our plaintiff's puzzle is overcoming the test set forth
by the Supreme Court in its Kiobel decision, where it determined that the
ATS claim must "touch and concern" the territory of the United States
"with sufficient force" so as to "displace" the presumption against the
123. Warren Strobel and Jonathan Landay, Exclusive: As Saudis bombed Yemen, US.
worried aboutlegal blowback, REUTERS (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-

saudi-yemen/exclusive-as-saudis-bombed-yemen-u-s-worried-about-legal-blowback-idUSKCN
12A0BQ.
124. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 41; Aaron Gregg & Christian Davenport, Defense
contractors stand with White House on Saudi arms sales, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2018),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/10/25/defense -contractors-stand-with-whitehouse-saudi-arms-sales/.
125. Aaron Gregg and Christian Davenport, Defense contractorsstand with White House on
Saudi arms sales, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2018).
126. Julian Borger, US supplied bomb that killed 40 children on Yemen school bus,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/19/us-supplied-

bomb-that-killed-40-children-school-bus-yemen. In more private settings, company leaders have
commented more directly. Just a few months after the conflict began, Ronald L. Perrilloux Jr.,
Lockheed's director of international business for the Middle East and North Africa, spoke on a
panel at an event promoting the U.S.-Saudi alliance and sponsored by leading oil, gas, and defense
industry titans. At the event, he acknowledged but disputed the "hostile media reports"
contributing to public pushback against sending support to the Yemen conflict. He went on to
sympathize with the Saudi-led coalition's view that "the application of human rights laws" are
disproportionately used against them compared to others such as China, constitute "a significant
irritant." Lee Fang, Lockheed Martin, Boeing Rally AroundSaudi Arabia, Wave OffHumanitarian
Concerns, INTERCEPT (Oct. 23, 2015), https://theintercept.com/2015/10/23/saudi-arabia-boeing-

lockheed-martin/. Shortly thereafter, Congress was notified of a massive arms sale to Saudi Arabia
that some believe could have contained the Lockheed Martin-made bomb used to blow up the
school bus full of children in Dahyan. See, e.g., Cruickshank, A Saudi War-Crime in Yemen?
Analysing the Dahyan Bombing, BELLINGCAT (Aug. 18, 2018), https://www.bellingcat.com/

news/mena/2018/08/18/19432/.
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extraterritorial reach of statutes. 12 ' The Court's majority didn't provide
clear guidance on what would pass the "touch and concern" test, 128 but
instead narrowly ruled on what does not pass the test: a fact pattern with
all "relevant conduct" occurring abroad between foreign plaintiffs and
defendants. 129
Lower courts have wrestled with applying the post-Kiobel standard in
ATS cases against U.S. corporations for claims that involve both foreign
and domestic activities, 130 but have found relevant factors to include the
nationality of the corporation, citizenship of the employees whose
conduct is in question, the location in which key decisions and approvals
took place, and whether the U.S. government provided support like a
contractual agreement, payment, and security clearances domestically. 131
An illustrative case is Al-Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc.
In this case, foreign plaintiffs brought suit against a U.S. corporation for
alleged torture sustained during detention in Iraq. 132 Using a "fact-based
inquiry" as instructed by Kiobel,133 the Fourth Circuit emphasized that
127. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124-25.

128. All three of Kiobel's concurrences made clear that the Court left these questions
unanswered. Id. at 125 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (" [T]he Court is careful to leave open a number
of significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation of the [ATS]."); Id. at 125-26
(Alito, J., concurring) (commenting that the Court's touch and concern "formulation obviously
leaves much unanswered"); id. at 131 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[The Court] offers
only limited help in deciding the question presented.... It leaves for another day the determination
of just when the presumption against extraterritoriality might be 'overcome."').
129. In Kiobel, Nigerian petitioners brought claim against a foreign corporation based on
conduct occurring in Nigeria), in which a "mere corporate presence" in the U.S. by the defendant
(i.e., listing on the New York Stock Exchange and affiliation with a public relations office) was
not enough to displace the presumption. Id. at 125.
130. Essentially, the courts are split on whether "significant contacts within the United States
are sufficient to trigger ATS jurisdiction or whether the violation of the 'law of nations' that is the
subject matter of the ATS must itself take place within the United States." John B. Bellinger, III
and R. Reeves Anderson, As Kiobel Turns Two: How the Supreme Court is Leaving the Details
to Lower Courts, INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM (Aug. 2015),

https://www.instituteforlegal

reform.com/uploads/sites/1/Kiobel v6.pdf. Some have determined that Kiobel's holding means
that the more stringent "focus test" derived from Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. should
also be applied, requiring that the courts examine whether the conduct that was the focus of the
statute took place inside the United States, essentially requiring the tortious activity to occur
domestically. See, e.g., Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 2017);
Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576 (11th Cir. 2015); Mastafav. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170
(2d Cir. 2014); See also John Bellinger and Andy Wang, The Alien Tort Statute and the Morrison
"Focus" Test: Still Disagreement After RJR Nabisco, LAWFARE (Feb. 21, 2017, 1:02 PM),

https ://www.lawfareblog.com/alien-tort-statute-and-morrison-focus-test-still-disagreement-after
-rjr-nabisco. Other courts have rejected applying the Morrison "focus test" and examined the
weight of the facts to determine whether enough relevant domestic conduct occurred in order to
sufficiently rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality.
131. Al Shimari v. Caci Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 528-29. (4th Cir. 2014).
132. Id. at 525.
133. Id. at 520.
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though the injuries were sustained abroad, the totality of the claims
touched and concerned the United States sufficiently in that the defendant
was a U.S. corporation, the defendant's employees involved in the
alleged torture were U.S. citizens, and that aiding and abetting activity
had occurred within the United States when corporate managers
implicitly encouraged the misconduct. 134
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit in Mujica v. AirScan Inc. dismissed a
claim brought under the ATS by Colombian plaintiffs against an oil
company and a private security firm, both U.S. corporations, for alleged
complicity in a bombing in Colombia. 135 In that case, the defendant
corporations acted in tandem with the Colombian government to conduct
a raid against insurgents in order to protect an oil pipeline project that
knowingly targeted civilians. The corporate' defendants' support to the
Colombian government included providing space to plan the attack,
providing a plane, and giving other material and logistical support, all
while located in Colombia. In dismissing the ATS claim, the court
reasoned that all of the conduct alleged, from planning to execution,
occurred outside the United States and that the only allegations offered
by the plaintiff of U.S.-based conduct involved speculation that some of
the planning could have occurred within the United States. 136 The Ninth
Circuit thus held that the defendant's status as a U.S. corporation was
insufficient in itself to overcome the Kiobel "touch and concern" test. 137
Our plaintiff's case is more like Al-Shimari than Mujica, with a strong
argument that their claim sufficiently touches and concerns the U.S. as to
rebut the presumption as prescribed by Kiobel. If, for example, our
plaintiff is a surviving family member of a decedent in the Dahyan bus
strike, they will likely point to the fact that though the bombing took place
in Yemen, the aiding and abetting took place in the United States.
Lockheed Martin is a U.S. company headquartered in Bethesda,
Maryland. 138 The company manufactured the bomb in the U.S.,139
conducted the sales, and received the money from within the U. S., and
public statements indicate that corporate leadership within the U.S. has
aggressively pursued additional sales to Saudi Arabia and UAE
134. Id. at 528-29.
135. Mujicav. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 584. (9th Cir. 2014).
136. Id. at 592.
137. Id. at 594.
138. About Lockheed Martin: Where We Are, LOCKHEED MARTIN, https://www.lockheed
martin. com/en-us/who-we-are. html.
139. U.S. Navy Awards Lockheed Martin $24 Million in Contracts For Cost-Saving

Enhanced Laser Guided Training Rounds, LOCKHEED MARTIN (June 8, 2015),
https://news.lockheedmartin.con2015 -06-08-U-S-Navy-Awards-Lockheed-Martin-24-Millionin-Contracts-for-Cost-saving-Enhanced-Laser-Guided-Training-Rounds
("Lockheed Martin's
350,000-square-foot production facility in northeastern Pennsylvania designs and manufactures
combat-proven Paveway II Plus LGB kits.").
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throughout the conflict. Further, Lockheed Martin is the largest but not
the only entity in a sprawling weapons industry1 4 0 that is tightly
intertwined with the U.S. government in protecting and procuring these
sales. Unlike Mujica, in which the acts of aiding and abetting took place
entirely outside the United States, the decision-making and
implementation of the support in our case appear to have taken place
entirely inside the United States. 141
Our plaintiff thus is likely to argue that, as the company in question is
a U.S. corporation that built the weapon in the U.S. and worked with the
U.S. government within the U.S. to make the sale that enabled the
unlawful strike, the claim "touches and concerns" the U.S. so as to meet
the Kiobel standard.
C. Hurdle Three: Can U.S. Corporationsbe Suedfor Aiding and
Abetting War Crimes Under the ATS?
The corporate defendant in this case will likely ask the courts to hold
that U.S. corporations may not be held liable for international law
violations under the ATS. Though the Supreme Court has held that
foreign corporations may not be sued under the ATS, the question of U.S.
corporate liability remains open, and our plaintiff should argue that U.S.
corporations can and must be held accountable for violations of human
rights obligations through ATS channels.
To exclude them from liability would be out of step with history, as
well as domestic and international legal precedent. When the Second
Circuit split from other appellate courts to entirely preclude corporate
liability under the ATS, the majority's analysis was in error. Judge
Leval's concurrence in that case emphasized that international law sets
the substantive norms but leaves implementation decisions to the
municipal law of states.14 1 Similarly, when the Supreme Court
determined in Jesnerv. Arab Bank that foreign corporations categorically
could not be held liable under the ATS 14 3 in part because corporate
140. Samuel Stebbins & Evan Comen, Military spending: 20 companiesprofiting the most
from war, USA TODAY (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/02/21/
military-spending-defense-contractors-profiting-from-war-weapons-sales/3 9092315/.
141. This is what can be inferred by public-facing information, though the discovery process
would be required to pinpoint with specificity when and where each decision and action took
place.
142. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 152 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Contrary to
what the majority opinion asserts, for purposes of the ATS, the critical question is not whether
customary international law does or does not establish corporate liability for violations of human
rights, but rather whether today corporate entities can be said to be the bearer of rights and
obligations directly under international law.").
143. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC,

138 S. Ct. 1386, 1400 (2018). Jesner's majority

distinguished between foreign and U.S. corporations as a matter of judicial restraint, but a plurality
would have barred corporate ATS liability completely.
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liability has not ripened into a norm of customary international law,
Justice Sotomayor's dissent insisted this reasoning "fundamentally
misconceives how international law works." 144 Indeed, the analysis for
whether a corporation may be a subject of international law is an
altogether different question than whether the substantive wrong meets
the narrow Sosa test for justiciability.
The International Court of Justice has emphasized that the
"requirements of international life" include a responsibility to integrate
agents of power into an international governance structure that furthers
the objectives of fundamental human rights. 14 5 This reality is increasingly
reflected in international soft law such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 146 the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights, 147 and can be seen in international tribunal precedents such as
Nuremberg. 148

144. Id. at 1419 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
145. Gunter Handl, In Re South African Apartheid Litigation and Beyond: Corporate

Liabilityfor Aiding and Abetting under the Alien Tort Statute, 53 GERM. YBK. OF INT'L L. 425,
433 (2010) ("Such capacity or status, as the International Court of Justice's (I.C.J.) analysis in the
Reparations for Injuries Case makes clear, reflects "the requirements of international life," or - as
in the case of corporate actors, specifically - "the need of the community to integrate agents of
effective power into an international governance structure that underpins the fundamental
objectives and values of international society.") (citing Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the
Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 1949, p. 8 (Apr. 11, 1949)).
146. Id. at 437 ("Further, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which lays down a
"common standardfor all peoples and all nations" and commits "every individual and every organ
of society [...] to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and [...] to secure their universal
and effective recognition and observance." As Professor Henkin observes, its reference to 'every
individual includes juridical persons. Every individual and every organ of society excludes no
one, no company, no market, no cyberspace."') (citing Louis Henkin, The Universal Declaration
at 50 and the Challenge of GlobalMarkets, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 29 (1999)).

147.

U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON

13 (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHREN.pdf ("The responsibility to respect human rights is a global
standard of expected conduct for all business enterprises wherever they operate. It exists
independently of States' abilities and/or willingness to fulfil their own human rights obligations
and does not diminish those obligations. And it exists over and above compliance with national
laws and regulations protecting human rights."); see also OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R ON HUMAN
BUSINESS AND HUMAN Rights

RIGHTS, THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERPRETIVE GUIDE

(Jan. 2012), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR.PUB.12.2_En.pdf;

INT'L COMM.

OF THE RED CROSS, BUSINESS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN

LAW (2006), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/ misc/business-ihl-150806.htm.
148. See Jonathan A. Bush, The Prehistoryof Corporationsand Conspiracyin International
Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really Said, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 1094, 1094-95 (2009)

(("[C]riminal charges against corporations were considered entirely permissible, though
ultimately not used.").
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In U.S. domestic law, corporations enjoy increasingly broad rights,
and so it stands to reason that they must also bear responsibilities. 149
Indeed, the D.C. Circuit Court has asserted that "[t]he notion that
corporations could be held liable for their torts.. would not have been
surprising to the First Congress that enacted the ATS.""O At the time of
drafting, companies were regularly held accountable in the courts for
their actions, including violations of international law,1 51 yet the drafters
of the ATS declined to exclude corporations from liability or otherwise
specify in its text who a foreign national could sue for violations of the
law of nations. 152
As such, most U.S. courts to take up the issue have determined that
corporations may be held liable under the ATS. 153 The Seventh Circuit
reasoned in Flomo v. Firestone Co. that "corporate tort liability is
common around the world" and pointed to the illogical outcome of
barring corporate liability in which "a pirate can be sued under the Alien
Tort Statute but not a pirate corporation." 154
Indisputably, the Supreme Court's ATS decisions are trending toward
narrowing the scope of cognizable claims. But for now, U.S. corporate
accountability survives, and our plaintiff's case is a particularly
compelling example of why it must continue.
IV. POTENTIAL DEFENSES THAT THE CORPORATE DEFENDANT MAY
RAISE

Our weapons manufacturer defendant will likely attempt to claim
derivative sovereign immunity against this ATS lawsuit. The companies
that manufacture and supply the weapons consistently deflect to the U.S.
government when asked to comment on their role in the civilian
destruction in Yemen. Thus, it follows that they would seek to cloak
themselves in the U.S. government's sovereign immunity against

claims. 155
149. Harold H. Koh, Separating Myth from Reality About Corporate Responsibility
Litigation, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 263, 365 (2014) ("If corporations have rights under international

law, by parity of reasoning, they must have duties as well.").
150. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
151. Heather Cohen, The DraftersKnew Best: CorporateLiabilityand the Alien Tort Statute,
OPINION JURIS (Sept. 14, 2017), http://opiniojuris.org/2017/09/14/the-drafters-knew-bestcorporate-liability-and-the-alien-tort-statute/.
152. Id.
153. See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248
F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008); Sarei v.
Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007); but see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,

621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
154. Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011).
155. Lockheed Martin spokespersons have asserted that they simply follow U.S. policy:
William Hartung, Defense Contractors are Tightening their Grip on Our Government, THE
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Per federal common law, as derived from English common law, the
U.S. government cannot be sued without its consent.15 6 With the
increasingly intertwined role of private companies in government
functions, courts have fashioned the doctrine of derivative sovereign
immunity to clarify when and how this protection may be imputed to
government contractors. In 2018, the Supreme Court stated clearly in
Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez that federal contractors do not share the
government's unqualified immunity from liability and litigation. 157
Instead, through precedent first established in Yearsley v. WA. Ross
Const. Co., contractors, acting as agents of the federal government, may
be shielded against lawsuits if (1) they are acting within the authority
delegated to them by the government, and (2) the authority was lawfully

delegated.

158

But a weapons manufacturer facing an ATS suit in our case would not
be eligible for derivative sovereign immunity. When contractors such as
Lockheed Martin or Raytheon sell weapons to Saudi Arabia or the United
Arab Emirates, they are performing commercial transactions through one
of two channels: Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) and Foreign Military
Sales (FMS). 159 In the FMS process, the sale is government-togovernment, and the Pentagon plays a central role by securing the
agreement, facilitating the sale, and contracting out production of the
weaponry to the contractor. In the DCS process, the company negotiates
the sale directly with the foreign government and secures an export
license from the State Department but does not include the U.S.
government as a party to the sale. Though it is difficult to ascertain from
publicly available documentation precisely which channel the weapon in

NATION (July 16, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/military-industrial-complex-

defense-contractors-raytheon-united-technologies-merger/ ("Most of these agreements that we
have are government-to-government purchases, so anything that we do has to follow strictly the
regulations of the U.S. government .... Beyond that, we'll just work with the U.S. government
as they are continuing their relationship with Saudi [Arabia]."). A Raytheon official similarly
offered, "Our role is not to make policy, our role is to comply with it." Natasha Turak, Raytheon
InternationalCEO on weapons sales to Saudi Arabia: 'We don't make policy,"' CNBC (Feb. 16,
2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/16/raytheon-exec-on-sales-to-saudi-arabia-we-dont-make

-policy.html. The Aerospace Industries Association has said it will continue to "support U.S.
national security and foreign policy goals, and our companies will continue to look to the
government for direction on how best to support those goals." Gregg and Davenport, supra note
126.
156. U.S. v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); Katherine Florey, Sovereign Immunity's
Penumbras: Common Law, "Accident," and Policy in the Development of Sovereign Immunity
Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 765, 784 (2008).
157. Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 U.S. 663, 672 (2016).
158. Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Const. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21 (1940).

159. NAT'L DEF. INDUS. ASS'N, FOREIGN
https://www.ndia.org/policy/international/fms-vs-dcs.
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our Dahyan test case passed through,16 0 in either scenario, this defense

should fail.
The DCS process categorically places the contractor's activities
outside the scheme contemplated by Yearsley and its progeny. Derivative
sovereign immunity is limited to contractors acting as an agent of the
federal government, in which the government provides "reasonably
precise" instructions to a contractor to carry out a government function
without its own discretion in the design process. 161 By negotiating and
carrying out a sale directly with a foreign government through DCS
channels, the contractor is not performing work as an agent of the U.S.
government and thus may not invoke Yearsley immunity. 16 2
But even if the contractor has engaged in the FMS process and is thus
more likely to be found an agent of the government (or, should courts
disagree that the Yearsley standard categorically does not apply to a
defendant completing a sale pursuant to DCS channels), the contractor
should still fail in its attempt to invoke derivative sovereign immunity as
it cannot overcome the required elements. For though the first element
may be met (acting within the bounds of the authority granted by the
United States government), the second element would not (the activity
must be lawfully authorized), as the U.S. government cannot lawfully
authorize the aiding and abetting of war crimes. 16 3 Thus, an attempted
defense of derivative sovereign immunity should fail.
160. The identification number on the debris at the Dahyan site allows public identification
of which manufacturer made the bomb, but not when or when.
161. See Cabalce v. Thomas E. Blanchard & Associates, 797 F.3d 720, 732 (9th Cir. 2015)
("We have held that derivative sovereign immunity ... is limited to cases in which a contractor
'had no discretion in the design process and completely followed government specifications."').
162. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1001 (9th Cir. 2008); see also
McCrossinv. IMO Indus., Inc., No. 3:14-CV-05382, 2015 WL 575155, *7 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 11,

2015) ("[t]he Yearsley Court based this defense on traditional agency principles where the
contractor-agent had no discretion in the design process").
163. See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 840 F.3d 147, 157 (4th Cir. 2016). ("[T]he

military cannot lawfully exercise its authority by directing a contractor to engage in unlawful
activity."); Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 395 (2012) ("Qualified immunity may be overcome.

. . if the defendant knew or should have known that his conduct violated a right 'clearly
established' at the time of the episode in suit.")(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); Ruddell v. Triple Canopy Inc., No. 1:15-cv-01331
(LMB/JFA), 2016 WL 4529951 (E.D. Va. Aug. 29, 2016) (When "Congress has prohibited the

federal sovereign" from taking an action, the government cannot lawfully authorize a contractor
to take that same action). Our corporate defendants may protest, as have others facing ATS claims,
that it is unfair for them to be left alone "holding the bag" for activity from which the government
is immune from liability. See Filarsky, 566 U.S. at 391 ("Because government employees will
often be protected from suit by some form of immunity, those working alongside them could be
left holding the bag-facing full liability for actions taken in conjunction with government
employees who enjoy immunity for the same activity."); see also Al Shimari v. CACI Premier
Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014); Salim v. Mitchell, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1132 (E.D. Wash.

2017). This argument does not pass muster. As the Eastern District of New York pointed out when
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Similarly, our corporate defendant should also fail in any attempt to
argue the non-justiciability of this claim by invoking political question
concerns or the act of state doctrine. Turning first to whether the claim
constitutes a non-justiciable political question, our defendant may assert
that courts shouldn't weigh in, as it may interfere with U.S. foreign policy
decisions better suited for the political branches. But in the same Baker
v. Carr decision in which the Supreme Court established factors
indicating non-justiciability (such as deference to political branches on
certain policy matters), it also dismissed a categorical pronouncement
that "every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies
beyond judicial cognizance." 164 Indeed, though foreign affairs are
constitutionally delegated to the political branches, it is the judiciary's
role to determine what the law is and whether there has been a
violation, 165 and the ATS itself constitutes a congressional assignment to
the courts to review violations of the law of nations. 166 Moreover, as a
hypothetical plaintiff in our case would not be challenging U.S. foreign
policy so much as they would be seeking damages resulting from a
commercial transaction by a private actor, the claim does not constitute a
non-justiciable political question.

considering an ATS case against the corporation that supplied Agent Orange for use in the
Vietnam War: "'Unfairness' to government contractors is not a convincing ground for ignoring
their corporate liability under international law since. . .to establish liability, the plaintiffs would
have to show that the usage was illegal under international law; the defendants knew how their
product would be used; and, that with knowledge, they supplied the product, facilitating and
becoming a party to the illegality." In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 91
(E.D.N.Y. 2005). This is exactly what our plaintiff will seek to establish, and thus derivative
sovereign immunity will not suffice in defense. Relatedly, it is essential to once again point out
that business entities have their own agency and responsibilities apart from the government's.
Beyond legal standards, companies simply do not have to fulfill contracts that they know are likely
to perpetuate unlawful behaviors. Weapons manufacturers are not passive actors in this or any
conflict and should not be able to hide behind the government to avoid responsibility for their
decisions. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 41, at 4 ("Like all companies, corporates operating in
the defence sector must put in place proactive preventive measures to address the human rights
risks that the misuse of their products and services pose. These measures should include robust
human rights due diligence policies and processes - separate from those of the state - to identify,
prevent, mitigate and account for how companies address both their potential and actual human
rights impacts.").
164. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
165. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the

province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."); U.S. Const. art. III § 2; see
also W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 408-10 (1990) (finding

there is no general "principle of abstention" that allows courts to dismiss a case simply because it
implicates U.S. foreign policy).
166. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,731 (2004) ("Congress, however, has not

only expressed no disagreement with our view of the proper exercise of judicial power, but has
responded ... by enacting legislation supplementing the judicial determination in some detail.").
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Neither should the act of state doctrine preclude our plaintiff's case
from moving forward. Though it is well-established that courts will not
"sit in judgment on the acts of' another government, 167 they are cautious
in allowing such concerns to bar cases involving purely commercial
activity. 168 Further, as made clear by the Supreme Court, "the greater the
degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of
international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render
decisions regarding it."169 This was emphasized by the court in Filartiga,
which held that violations of clear international legal consensus could not
be considered unreviewable under the act of state doctrine and thus
170
launched the modern era of ATS litigation.
CONCLUSION

Courts have placed increasingly high hurdles before plaintiffs seeking
relief under the ATS. But our hypothetical plaintiff can overcome those
hurdles. The harm suffered by Yemeni civilians is not an unfortunate but
necessary byproduct of a foreign war. It is the result of business decisions
made by American companies in the United States to manufacture and
sell American bombs that garner billions of American dollars, with the
approval of the U.S. government. It is a continuing result from years of
complicity and a refusal to alter those business decisions despite the
knowledge that the bombs are being used to commit war crimes. Those
decisions have consequences, and the ATS provides one avenue for
accountability. The weapons manufacturers must face that accountability,
rather than continuing to hide behind the U.S. government. As a member
of the U.N. expert panel on Yemen said, "There are no clean hands in this
conflict. Everybody, everybody is responsible." 17 1

167.
168.
169.
170.

Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 698 (1976).
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
Filartiga v. Pena-Irela, 577 F. Supp. 860, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) ("Where the principle of

international law is as clear and universal as the Court of Appeals has found it to be, there is no
reason to suppose that this court's assumption of jurisdiction would give justifiable offense to
Paraguay.").
171. Nick Cumming-Bruce, War Crimes Committed by Both Sides in Yemen, UN. Panel
Says, N.Y. TIMEs (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/03/world/middleeast/warcrimes-yemen.html.
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